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In mid-April, another video spread on the internet in which Russian military personnel complained about the “carelessness and inappropriate attitude” of their superiors. The heroes of this video are five people, their faces covered with dense black fabric, and their hats’ brims hide their eyes. There is nothing remarkable in this story at all: we are used to such videos and that we cannot see the faces of those who appear in them.
The Russian army is essentially a collective of faceless people. Middle and junior officers, as well as ordinary soldiers, are mostly shown in masks and balaclavas in TV reports and social media. Russian mercenaries also prefer not to reveal their faces – for example, in propagandistic films about the Wagner PMC such as “Contract with the Motherland” by the RT channel, we only see the fighters’ eyes. And during the 426 days of full-scale war, none of these people have become full-fledged frontmen: Russian propaganda almost never talks about generals and their front-line deeds.
Today’s article is about how and why it happened.
NAVIGATION
In the text of almost 14,000 characters, you will read it in 9 minutes.
The letter is divided into three chapters. The first is about soldiers who hide their faces behind masks and commanders who hide behind their positions. The second tells about the media generals of the nineties who were able to build a political career. And from the third, you will learn about the side effects of a “depersonalized” army.
What does a Russian military member look like?
The question that is difficult to answer
With the beginning of a full-scale war in Ukraine, a new hero has appeared in the eyes of Russian state authorities and loyal media. He appears in television news programs during prime time, in video clips of news agencies and in telegram channels of military correspondents, where he reports on the successes of the Russian army on the battlefield. It’s easy to meet him in city groups on VKontakte, where he cheerfully greets his fellow countrymen. Or he may come to a regular school to talk to students.
This person is a faceless soldier.
On his forehead is a cap, hat, or helmet, with dark glasses hiding his eyes. His features are indistinguishable behind a mask, balaclava, or bandana. The disguise may be virtual – photos are often edited in such a way that the fighters cannot be recognized. Russian military personnel hide their faces both on the front lines and after returning home. They sometimes even receive awards for their service while wearing masks.
These people not only have faces but also names. Some of them have nicknames, for example, Khan, Multik, Indus, Doc, Sergeant, Cat, or even Chikatilo. All of these are real names of Russian soldiers, and the “Moskovsky Komsomolets” magazine dedicated a separate article to them. It says that “when communicating with military personnel in the operation zone, the first thing you usually learn about a person is their nickname”, and all soldiers, from frontline troops to rear services and from soldiers to generals, have such nicknames. The text directly states that many soldiers prefer not to give their real names to journalists, but their nicknames are always available.
During the mid-2010s, “polite people” in Crimea and fighters in Donbass also concealed their identity, when the Kremlin denied the fact of military presence on Ukrainian soil. But in the current phase of the conflict, Russian military personnel have reasons to hide: at least, it will protect them from doxing, data breaches, and calls to their families, and at most — allow them to fight freely, disregarding international law.
In any case, a person without a name and a face is a sinister image. And it’s not just about people with weapons. French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas wrote that the face is the main form of representation, and first and foremost, we introduce ourselves to each other through faces. Therefore, in the Christian tradition, masks always had a bad reputation: according to the Bible, God created man in his own image, and it is not right to cover the divine with a mask.
In the culture of the modern era, the mask was also perceived negatively – it was believed that behind it, criminals hide their true dark essence. “A person who puts on a mask was deliberately perceived as someone who violated the generally accepted norm, broke the law, because now he can pass and act without being noticed by society. Therefore, the mask in the modern era finds its place in such marginal forms of culture as carnival and masquerade, where a person had the opportunity to hide themselves, to get out of the usual forms of society,” explains researcher of Levinas’ work, Maxim Evstropov.
In turn, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard pointed out that a person’s social role is also a kind of mask. It is easy to hide behind social functions such as professional or family roles, and in his dissertation, philosophical candidate Arthur Kostomarov writes: “By accepting one’s social image as one’s true self, the subject becomes accustomed to seeing their face in their image. Thus, the mask gradually begins to replace the face and takes its place.”
The leadership of the Russian army does not hide their faces behind balaclavas, but successfully hides behind high positions. We do not see Russian military with large stars on their epaulettes at the front and only know who is formally commanding which section of the front at the moment. For example, in February, the commanders of four military districts in Russia were replaced, and two of them were immediately promoted to the rank of General Colonel. Generally, this is one of the highest army ranks (after Marshal and Army General, but there are no Marshals in Russia), but what do the names Sergei Kuzovlev, Andrey Mordvichev, Rustam Muradov, and Evgeny Nikiforov tell you? Almost certainly nothing.
The same can be said about the commander of the Russian invasion. The first person to hold this position, whose name was publicly announced by the Ministry of Defense, was General Sergei Surovikin – seven months after the start of a full-scale war in October 2022. At that time, the media was eagerly reporting on the biography of this man, who was called “General Armageddon” for his ability to act tough and unconventional. However, Surovikin did not last long – he was replaced by General Valery Gerasimov after three months, and the “General Armageddon” was demoted to deputy, after which he practically disappeared from the information field.
Neither Surovikin nor Gerasimov have become popular public figures. The latter gave only one interview after his appointment, but it is impossible to read. The conversation is almost entirely devoted to the history of the General Staff, and those parts where modernity is discussed are devoid of meaning. Like this, for example: “Currently, the personal staff of the General Staff is taking all measures to achieve the goals of a special military operation set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as well as ensuring the military security of our country based on existing military threats.”
In short, only masks, only call signs, only abstract surnames of the generals who are responsible for unclear things, and rare footage of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visits to the front (however, where the minister actually goes is an open question). That’s all we are told about the Russian army, which has been waging a full-scale war for over a year.
Why have media generals disappeared?
The secret of Alexander Lebed’s popularity.
But maybe modern wars are being fought semi-anonymously? No, and the example of Ukraine proves it. Soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine often appear without masks, and the army of the country has many well-known military leaders: from the commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyy to the commander of the troops of the operational command “South” Andriy Kovalchuk. Both, by the way, often speak publicly and give interviews, including to foreign media – examples can be seen here, here, and here.
Influential Ukrainian generals regularly visit the front – for example, the besieged city of Bakhmut was recently visited by the commander of the ground forces Alexander Syrsky and the leader of the Ukrainian military intelligence Kirill Budanov. And even the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has visited the front many times, including his recent visit to Avdiivka.
The Russian Army did not always hide behind masks either. During the Chechen wars, soldiers of the federal forces did not cover their faces, and commanders were constantly seen in television reports. Among them were, for example, Lieutenant Generals Gennady Troshev (who commanded the joint group of federal forces in the First and Second Chechen Wars), Anatoly Romanov (who commanded the joint group of federal forces during the First Chechen War and was involved in the mass murder in the village of Semashki), and Vladimir Shamanov (this “protégé” of Troshev led the federal forces in the First and Second Chechen Wars). General Alexander Lebed stands apart – perhaps the most famous Russian military figure of the 90s.
At different times, Alexander Lebed participated in suppressing anti-Soviet uprisings in Tbilisi and Baku, the August coup (at first on the side of the GKChP, and then on the side of Boris Yeltsin), and the armed conflict in Transnistria, which was frozen with his direct participation. Lebed criticized the introduction of federal troops into Chechnya and spoke about the possibility of leading the command of Russian troops in this conflict as follows: “If we are talking about withdrawing Russian troops from Chechnya, then I am ready to lead this operation.” In the mid-1990s, the general turned to a political career: he participated in the 1996 presidential elections, where he took third place, after which he headed the Security Council of Russia (and in this position signed the peace agreements of Khassavyurt), and then the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Lebed died in 2002, when the helicopter he was flying in to open a ski slope in the Eastern Sayan Mountains collided with power lines and crashed.
Current officials and political technologists in the presidential administration remember the phenomenon of media generals from the 90s very well. They had a fairly wide circle of fans, which is why military officials often went into politics and achieved success – Lebed was one of them. Boris Gromov, who led the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, headed the Moscow region. Another participant in the Afghan war, Alexander Rutskoi, became the governor of the Kursk region. The chair of the governor of the Ulyanovsk region was already occupied by Vladimir Shamanov, mentioned earlier. And Georgy Shpak, a participant in the wars in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Chechnya, was in charge of the Ryazan region.
Propaganda does not rush to create heroes from modern generals and senior officers precisely because verticals do not need characters who will become popular and politically independent. Especially now, when many Russians are tired of military news and are concerned about constant rumors of a “second wave of mobilization” – even if they are generally loyal to the regime. If some high-ranking military were to appear now with talks about the need to end the war, he would automatically attract attention to himself. Vladimir Putin, who came to power precisely on the wave of nostalgia among Russians for a strong hand, cannot not understand this.
To some, the political threat from the generals may seem imaginary, but keeping them in the shadows is not without reason. This is clearly seen in the popularity of someone like Lebed and his ideas even 20 years after his death. In the absence of military media, social media users actively share the general’s musings, and clips with his phrases like “Every war begins as a dead end, then becomes a catastrophe” and “Even hundred-year wars end in negotiations and peace… So maybe we can exclude this uncivilized part altogether?” are gaining millions of views.
For example, this video has been watched over 22 million times in just one year. “This is the only worthy video and reasonable words about what war is,” wrote one of the viewers below it. This comment received seventeen thousand likes.
What task does the faceless army solve?
And which one cannot be solved.
Back in April of 2022, we noted that Russian propaganda was trying to “sell” war as a kind of spectacle to the Russian people – a new Russian blockbuster or a show like tank biathlon. By the start of the invasion, the ideological groundwork for this had been laid: for many years, the army had been “dehumanized” in the country, with the focus placed mainly on its technical side. The signal that state media – primarily television – sent to society was simple: Russia’s modern equipment is capable of conducting military operations virtually without human involvement; soldiers are professionals who only need a little help from machines. So Russians were simply asked to root for “our guys” in the war in Ukraine – for the effective partnership between equipment and professional soldier-biorobots in masks.
However, the realities of the war have shown that the technology of the Russian armed forces is not that modern, and the battles are fought not only by machines but also by people – and they are dying in large numbers, so there is always a shortage of them. Those who are willing to fight, even for large sums of money by Russian standards – the minimum salary on the front line is 195,000 rubles – turned out to be not so many, so the reservists of the Wagner PMC headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin had to travel on a tour of Russian colonies. Finally, at the end of September 2022, Russians had their status changed: from fans, they unexpectedly turned into potential and actual participants in military actions, or their relatives. Thus, the war came to the homes of Russian citizens, although propaganda tried its best to make the majority watch it exclusively on TV.
A paradoxical situation arises. On the one hand, the authorities still want to restrain public anxiety, and therefore refuse the next wave of mobilization – despite all the circulating rumors, a new set has not been announced. On the other hand, they need more volunteers – both Russian and Western media have reported that 400,000 more people are needed, but it is impossible to confirm or deny them. Thirdly, at the regional level, fundraising for the needs of the front begins: local officials ask residents to donate vehicles or part of their salary to the army. And often these are propositions that cannot be refused – if, of course, you want to keep your job and have good relations with your superiors.
That is, the government is trying to solve opposite tasks. It is necessary to both leave a large part of society in the audience and to collect from it military conscription in the form of hundreds of thousands of men and material support. The demonstration of the army without faces and names effectively solves the first task but hinders dealing with the second and third.
Often, the face behind the mask only becomes visible for Russian soldiers after death: in reports of city publications, obituaries in local newspapers, on school “hero desks“. But life in exchange for one’s face is a bad deal. So, watching anonymous soldiers is fine, but citizens are obviously not in a hurry to become one of them. No matter how much propaganda tries to convince them that this is the only way to earn the right to consider themselves “real men“. Yes, in a recent video by the Ministry of Defense, Russians are called to fight with open-faced men. However, these are the faces of invited actors, not real soldiers.
In an anonymous army, there is another side effect – stories of people in masks without names and surnames about military “exploits” are difficult to take seriously. After all, if your face is not visible, then neither are you, and a “hero” cannot be an abstract figure in a balaclava.
Even to Russians who support the invasion, it is difficult to empathize with a faceless person and be proud of them, that’s why propaganda have big problems with their “heroes.” It’s easier to make a child a “hero” than a real military person – and that’s exactly what happened to 10-year-old Fedya from the Bryansk region. The media reported that he supposedly saved two girls from “an attack by Ukrainian saboteurs.” In late March, Putin awarded Fedya the “For Courage” medal.